




The PSOE’s deliberation and democratic innovations 
in turbulent times for the social democracy
Oscar Barberà1  · Juan Rodríguez‑Teruel1 
 
© European Consortium for Political Research 2019
Abstract
In the midst of the great recession, the Spanish Socialists Worker’s Party (PSOE) 
lost the Government and experienced a process of instability while trying to recon-
nect with its electorate. The party’s strategic response was embracing highly inclu-
sive deliberations on both key institutional and policy issues that eventually sparked 
tensions and division. These internal debates led to the introduction and implemen-
tation of other democratic innovations, such as direct votes and consultations that 
substantially transformed key features of the PSOE’s organizational model. The arti-
cle discusses the main features and problems of such deliberations and democratic 
innovations, and their wider consequences.
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Introduction
Social Democracy in Southern European countries faced hard choices after the 
financial and economic crisis of the late 2000s. Yet, not all parties shared the same 
fortune. In this context, the Spanish Socialists Worker’s Party (PSOE, in Spanish) 
might be taken as a successful case study of how a combination of scaling-up delib-
eration and democratic innovations contributed to address its organizational chal-
lenges, to reshape the party brand and, in the long run, to reverse its electoral mis-
fortunes. However, this was not an uncontroversial adaptation. As the Demos’ case 
study in this volume also shows (Gherghina and Stoiciu EPS2019), implementing 
party reforms in such a harsh political and socio-economic environment become 
quite a contested process that produced intra-party conflicts and transformed the 
internal power balance.
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The PSOE was formed in the late XIX century as a typical mass party but re-
emerged in the 1970s as catch all organisation under Felipe González’s leadership. 
González centralised and modernised its organisation, while adapting it to Spain’s 
emerging multi-level setting. A generous public funding regime and the party’s long 
tenure in government (1982–1996) favoured the predominance of the public office 
over the extra-parliamentary face (Gunther 1986; Share 1988; Van Biezen 2003). 
However, by the 1990s the PSOE’s organizational strength diminished due to its 
break-up with the socialist trade union, several political scandals and the growing 
quarrels between two main factions trying to control González’s succession (Mén-
dez 2000; Royo 2000). After losing the government, the party introduced limited 
reforms (party primaries) but most of its organizational features and factionalism 
remained the same. The main change was the emergence of some regional party 
leaders and prime ministers as key players in the party’s internal decision-making 
process. Their role was instrumental in José Luis Rodríguez-Zapatero’s selection as 
party leader and through his time in opposition (Méndez 2006). Rodríguez-Zapa-
tero’s opposition strategy was quite successful in leading the PSOE to the govern-
ment, but he mostly focused on renewing the old party elite, proposing new policies 
and mobilising its party members than introducing organizational reforms (Méndez 
2006; Encarnación 2009).
After two terms in government, by 2011 the PSOE got its worst results since 
1977. Rodríguez-Zapatero’s government was blamed for the poor handling of the 
crisis and the implementation of harsh austerity policies. Indeed, the social and polit-
ical consequences of the Great Recession led to low levels of trust in Spain’s main 
institutions, to declining party identifications and to a new wave of protests epito-
mised by the Indignados movement that started in May 2011 in the streets of Madrid 
and later on extended to all Spain. However, by the early 2010s Spain also faced 
relevant tensions linked to other political divides such as both mainstream parties’ 
adversary politics (crispación) and the centre-periphery cleavage that significantly 
contributed to a growing dissatisfaction with parties and institutions (Kennedy 2012; 
Bosco 2018, chap. 1 and 3). The end of the PSOE’s government was also marked by 
the return of factional disputes and the growing power of the regional party leaders. 
In this context, by 2011 and 2012 the party executive faced strong pressures from 
either the party membership or would-be party leaders to introduce organizational 
reforms and to change the party strategy. The PSOE’s main representative decision-
making agencies first partially contained the introduction of party primaries, but a 
lengthy and complex deliberation process led to key changes in the party organisa-
tion and strategy. Shortly afterwards, the 2015 and 2016 electoral deadlock opened a 
new internal debate on the party strategy that was strongly intertwined with the poli-
tics of the party leadership and other organizational issues. This second delibera-
tion process openly confronted the strategy and organizational model of the PSOE’s 
main representative bodies and party elites with the ones of the new party leader, 
Pedro Sánchez, and most of the party membership. Sánchez’s unexpected victory in 
the 2017 primaries led to a second wave of democratic innovations and to a change 
to the former party strategy (Delgado-Fernández and Cazorla-Martín 2017; Bosco 
2018, chap. 4; Correa, Barberà and Rodríguez-Teruel 2018). Some months later, that 
strongly contributed to the formation of a new socialist government. The following 
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section will present the main characteristics of such transformations, while the next 
one will shortly assess their main institutional and policy consequences.
A break with the past: general features and problems of the PSOE’s 
deliberations
The comparative literature and the introduction of this symposium have extensively 
analysed political parties’ response strategies to re-encapsulate a more volatile and 
eventually shrinking membership and electoral base (Gherghina, Soare and Jacquet 
EPS2019). The bulk of such organizational changes were based on vote-centric 
democratic innovations such as party primaries for candidates and party leaders and 
membership ballots for policy development (Cross and Katz 2013; Scarrow 2014; 
Sandri et  al. 2015). Far less attention has been paid to deliberative practices such 
as the ones implemented by the Czech, Romanian and Danish parties discussed in 
this volume (Vodova and Voda ECPS2019; Gad EPS2019; Gherguina and Stoiciu, 
EPS2019). Such empirical case studies are in line with a new turn in the deliberative 
theory suggesting the potential role of political parties as key facilitators of linkage 
among citizens and political elites through new conceptions of talk-centric intra-
party democracy (Teorell 1999; Rosenblum 2008; Invernizzi-Accetti and Wolken-
stein 2017). In this vein, Wolkenstein and his colleagues have suggested that par-
ties might be understood as a complex arrangement of multiple deliberative fora and 
institutions forming a whole deliberative system (Wolkenstein 2016, p. 6; Ebeling 
and Wolkenstein 2018). That said, most of this literature tends to focus on delibera-
tion at the local level or on local party branches because there seems to be easier 
to fulfil some of the classical requirements of equality, diversity or rationality sug-
gested by many deliberative theorists (e.g. Wolkenstein 2016, pp. 11–13, 2018, pp. 
3–7). Moving away from the local perspective, this section explores the context, 
main features and problems of the two most important debates held within the PSOE 
during its last time in the opposition. Its main point is to provide further evidences 
of how such deliberative systems might work in practice at the national level.
Expanding party primaries (2011–2014)
Most Spanish parties favoured leadership and candidate selection processes through 
representative party agencies or congresses with delegates since the late 1970s. That 
said, the party leadership enjoyed a paramount relevance in these processes, eventu-
ally in cooperation with the regional elites. Limited reforms were eventually intro-
duced in the late 1990s, such as the PSOE’s closed primaries to select top candi-
dates in particular circumstances, but none of the mainstream parties substantially 
changed their procedures till the early 2010s (Barberà et  al. 2015; Ramiro 2016). 
Between 2011 and 2014, the PSOE tried to break up with this tradition through the 
introduction of more inclusive selection methods (Table  1). The debate was first 
opened when Prime Minister Rodríguez-Zapatero withdrew from being candidate 
in the upcoming 2011 general elections. Two ministers from the cabinet (Carme 
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Chacón and Alfredo Pérez-Rubalcaba) emerged as contenders, which automatically 
would have led to party primaries. However, Chacón finally retired her candidature 
and there were no membership ballots. Pérez-Rubalcaba became the top candidate 
and right after the 2011 results; he also claimed the party leadership. That reopened 
the dispute with Chacón, and the internal debate on the selection of candidates and 
party leaders through primaries.1 The 2012 leadership contest was finally decided 
in a congress with delegates won by Pérez-Rubalcaba by a very slim margin. That 
congress also allowed to select the future national and regional top candidates (not 
the leaders) by members and supporters. That congress started an informal and bot-
tom up deliberative process in which emerged new demands for more inclusiveness. 
During several weeks, academics, commentators, groups of party members and even 
by some minority factions and regional elites made statements to the press or posted 
comments online on such issues. The exchange of arguments was highly rational 
(pros vs. cons) although it was connected to the politics of party leadership. It was 
also quite inclusive because expanded well beyond the party elites. At the same, 
there were recognisable differences in the influence of the different proposals. Inter-
estingly, it ended up with the party finally overcoming its reluctances and embracing 
party primaries. In 2013, the PSOE’s central office tolerated the election of Galicia’s 
regional party leader through a closed primary for the first time. After the 2014 EU 
elections, Pérez-Rubalcaba’s resignation paved the way to implement a similar pro-
cedure to select the new party leader, Pedro Sánchez. He then reformed the party 
statutes and tried to redefine the PSOE’s policies through a new reformist appeal in 
order to compete with two emerging parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos (Fundación 
Alternativas 2015, chap. 5; Bosco 2018, chap. 3; Correa et al. 2018).
Table 1  PSOE’s main debates and democratic innovations (2011–2017). Source: Authors’ own
Promoter Internal debates Main results
Contender and minority factions Party primaries (2011) No election (1 candidate)
Contender and minority factions Party strategy (2012) No shift
Party primaries (2012) Change of party statues
Party leader & Regional elites Territorial policy (2013) Policy Shift
Contenders Party strategy (2014) Strategy shift
Party primaries (2014) 1st party leadership primary
Change of party statutes
Party leader Coalition behaviour (2016) 1st consultation (PSOE & Cs deal)
Party leader Coalition behaviour (2016) Strategy shift
No party congress (and primaries)Party Council & Regional elites
Interim Committee Party Strategy and organization 
(2017)
Strategy and organizational shift
2nd party leadership primaries
Party primaries (2017)
1 Chacón suggested the introduction of open primaries to select the PSOE’s candidates (El País 2011). 
Some of Chacón’s supporters and other minority factions also claimed for party leadership primaries.
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Disagreements on the PSOE’s coalition behaviour and organizational model 
(2015–2017)
The 2015–2016 electoral deadlock distressed the Spanish politics. Despite the 
electoral results, Pedro Sánchez’s tried to strengthen his position as the PSOE’s 
party leader and to redefine the party strategy, which confronted him with some 
of his former allies. Facing a growing internal opposition, Sánchez’s tried to pro-
mote plebiscitary innovations (i.e. direct votes) in order to legitimise his leader-
ship. He did so through two initiatives. First, he conducted for the first time ever 
an internal referendum to support the PSOE and Ciudadanos’ agreement favour-
ing Sánchez’s investiture as prime minister. The internal consultation took place 
on February 2016 during 3 days through the miPSOE online platform and vot-
ing boxes in the local branches. Around 50% of the party members voted on that 
event and almost 80% of them did it in favour of the agreement. The innovation 
was considered a big success, and in the 2017 party congress the PSOE modified 
its statues to implement binding consultations for all future national and regional 
government agreements (and to allow internal referenda on other key decisions) 
(El País 2017). The second move has become much more controversial. Sánchez 
contested the 2016 general elections promising to veto a PP investiture (‘No es 
no’). The party accepted his stance during the campaign, but after the election it 
came under growing pressure for the PP was actively seeking the PSOE’s absten-
tion and blaming them for a possible third general election. In addition, a regional 
party leader insinuated that he was willing to challenge Sánchez’s leadership, 
which led to a growing number of party elites slowly positioning themselves 
against the veto.
That opened up a new informal deliberation that lasted for months. In a way, that 
was highly inclusive because several media outlets, some regional prime ministers, 
all former party leaders, the different factions and the party membership exchanged 
views on what to do in several fora inside and outside the party organisation. How-
ever, not all opinions were equally considered which might rise doubts on this 
requirement. Moreover, at some point even party unity seemed at stake which led 
to heated and emotional controversies. The rationality was also undermined because 
the party board and the press interpreted some of the comments as an open challenge 
to the party leadership. And yet, over time the party changed its position over these 
issues. Sánchez’s response consisted in intertwining the coalition behaviour and the 
leadership puzzles with the legitimacy of intra-party democracy. Hence, in order to 
avoid being challenged and being able to keep his veto, he tried to call for a new 
party congress which would also imply organising party primaries. At the end, he 
resigned as party leader and parliamentarian when the PSOE’s main representative 
party agency blocked his plans for that congress. That pointed out questions on the 
authority of the party leadership and on the legitimacy of representative institutions 
controlled by the party elites vis-à-vis the will of the party membership. Sánchez’s 
risky move proved to be right and, some months after an interim period, Sánchez 
won the primaries for the leadership. Shortly afterwards, a party congress reinforced 
party leadership’s powers and undermined the authority of the main representative 
bodies through the introduction of membership ballots (Bosco 2018, chap. 4).
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Assessing the electoral and organisational consequences
As the previous section has shown, the PSOE’s time in opposition was deeply 
marked by two complex and informal deliberations. As a result, the party ended 
up changing its original responses and developing new democratic innovations for 
policy development, such as party primaries and direct votes. In this respect, the 
PSOE’s also resembles the Danish Alternativet or the Romanian Demos in their 
quest for new forms of intra-party democracy (Gad EPS2019; Gherguina and Sto-
iciu, EPS2019). The electoral consequences of such internal debates and organi-
zational changes have been unclear, though. After the first deliberation process, 
Pedro Sánchez achieved the worst results ever in the two general elections (2015 
and 2016). On the contrary, the second internal deliberation not only improved the 
party showing at the polls, but allowed the PSOE to return to the government after 
unexpectedly winning a no-confidence vote. Once back in the executive, the party 
won the 2019 early election with almost 30 per cent of the votes and the highest 
number of absolute votes in 10 years. Nevertheless, this victory was less a direct 
effect of the successive primary votes than the product of its short stay in power and 
Podemos’ swift electoral decline. The electoral recovery also extended to the Euro-
pean, regional and local elections in May 2019.
The organisational consequences have been far more clear, as they contributed 
to strengthen the power of the party leader and to reinforce the disintermediation 
process to the detriment of the party middle-level elites (Biancalana 2018). In this 
respect, the PSOE followed the path of many cartel parties trying to react to weak-
ening linkages with its electoral base (Katz and Mair 1995; Biancalana 2018). At 
the party on the ground, the two internal deliberations and the adoption of party pri-
maries and membership consultations have also allowed a higher say of party mem-
bers on key internal decisions. In turn, that has increased the legitimacy and support 
for such mechanisms among the party grassroots. As seen in Table  2, a majority 
of the party activists already supported a stronger direct participation of the party 
members before their introduction. Interestingly, that support was reinforced 5 years 
later despite the conflicts generated by their introduction and implementation (see 
previous section). On the other hand, the internal tensions certainly did not help to 
expand the party membership, as the party lost the 5% of its members between 2014 
and 2017.
Another of the most outstanding consequences of the internal debates and the 
strengthening of direct votes has been the eroding power of the regional leaders. 
Table 2  Party activists’ support to intra-party democracy. Source: Own data, from a survey to the party 
delegates to the PSOE 38 and 39 Congresses (held in 2012 and 2017, respectively). Data show propor-
tion of individuals scoring 4 and 5 in a scale 1 (low importance) to 5 (high importance)
2012 2017
The more important decisions in a political party must be taken directly by the grass-
roots members
60.4 65.9
The leader and the candidates should be directly elected by the grassroots members 73.6 82.9
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This was particularly relevant between 2014 and 2017 for most of the internal con-
flicts of this period. The second informal deliberation process had also to do with 
the struggle between the party leader and the regional leaders to control the PSOE’s 
decision-making system. As stated in previous sections, the latter were instrumental 
in 2014 Sánchez’s victory, but during the 2015–2016 electoral deadlock, their dif-
ferences over the veto to the PP investiture lead to a certain clash of legitimacies. 
While Sánchez claimed that the ultimate decision should rest on the party member-
ship and the party statues had to change, the regional party leaders benefited from 
the status quo represented by the party statutes and their control of the main repre-
sentative bodies. Sánchez return to power after the 2017 primaries confirmed the 
disintermediation trend: he was less consensual in selecting the party executive and 
fostered organisational reforms to limit the power of the main representative party 
agencies through compulsory membership ballots for the party’s key decisions (gov-
ernment agreements, etc.). This plebiscitary turn also strengthened the role of the 
national executive to the detriment of the regional bodies’ autonomy. Overall, this 
also meant that the PSOE’s main deliberative fora were undermined.
Interestingly, most of such reforms have been defended with a populistic rheto-
ric against ‘the party elites’, usually identified with these territorial elites. In this 
respect, Sánchez leadership has often used an intensive populistic message to sus-
tain the division between him and his internal opponents, referring sometimes to 
those ‘powerful enemies’, including also economical and media actors outside the 
party.2 This discourse was also combined with an overwhelmingly personalistic 
style in his performance and decisions, unparalleled with previous leaders in the 
party (Rodríguez-Teruel 2019). Such discourses and style eventually ended up erod-
ing the rationality of the second deliberative process.
The empowerment of the party leader has also been reflected in the party at the 
institutions. On the one hand, the central office strengthened its control over the 
parliamentary party at the national parliament. This was particularly evident when 
Sánchez came back to the leadership after the 2017 primary election. Despite 
not having a parliamentary seat, he could reshuffle PSOE’s parliamentary group 
appointing an independent MP as a new chief. Until the end of that term, the parlia-
mentary strategy remained subordinated to the party leadership, adopting a second-
ary role in order not to overshadow him. Some months later, the candidate selection 
processes for the following general election produced an unprecedented removal of 
those MPs that had been openly critical with the leader. On the other hand, when 
Sánchez finally became prime minister, he benefited from the personal authority and 
the party power cumulated in his hands. Despite his parliamentary minority (just 
24% of the chamber), he enjoyed extended freedom to form a government with few 
2 Few days after his resignation in October 2016, Sánchez declared in a TV interview in prime time 
that he had been victim of a complot launched by internal party elites and other outer interests aiming to 
block a leftwing coalition government with Podemos (“Salvados”, La Sexta channel, 30 October 2016). 
Two years later in his book ‘Handbook of resistance’, Sánchez also referred to that incident arguing that 
the PSOE suffered from lack of democracy and leadership (Sánchez 2019, p. 38).
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parliamentary ministers, many of them non-affiliated to the PSOE, and to design an 
executive with high concentration of powers around the premiership.
Lessons learned and conclusions
The Spanish case, as the Danish Alternativet or the Romanian Domos, illustrates 
that embracing deliberation and promoting intra-party democracy alone may not be 
sufficient to (re)connect a party with its electoral base. The PSOE case study shows 
how the long deliberation process over the party primaries and its 2014 implemen-
tation could not reverse an adverse electoral trend. Conversely, a combination of 
democratic reforms and important strategic shifts like the ones derived from the 
2015–2017 internal deliberation process might help regain legitimacy, starting to 
reconnect with the voters and, eventually, profit from favourable contextual factors 
(the fortune or actions of other parties). That was indeed the case with the PSOE’s 
successful vote of no confidence in 2017.
The PSOE case also shows how its informal deliberation processes ended up 
strengthening the role of membership ballots and other plebiscitary forms of intra-
party democracy. To some extent, this has more to do with the critical juncture and 
internal division in the party than with the uses of deliberation. Direct voting and 
plebiscitary remedies emerged in the first deliberation as a way to challenge the 
power of a weak party leader (Rubalcaba). They resulted in the second deliberation 
as a way to strengthen Sánchez’s emerging leadership. As a result, the main out-
comes were the centralisation of power within the party, the personalisation of the 
leader, and the disintermediation of the internal dynamics to the detriment of the 
intermediate party agents. The authority and control of the party leader eroded the 
power of the factions, of the regional party leaders and, more broadly, of all the party 
middle-level elites. Indeed, many critics saw in that strategy a ‘Podemos-style’ turns 
in order to successfully compete with the new radical left. It is debatable to what 
extent such organisational changes led to the empowerment or disempowerment of 
the party grassroots. On the one hand, the party leadership and the party central 
office have probably become more responsive towards the membership demands. On 
the other one, deliberative fora and institutions were undermined.
Finally, this case study aimed to point out that parties might indeed develop large 
deliberative processes, as has been suggested by the normative theory (Wolkenstein 
2016; Ebeling and Wolkenstein 2018). Future research should focus on other com-
parative case studies in order to provide more empirical evidences of how and under 
which circumstances such processes are being implemented.
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